Refugees and Asylum Management in Tanzania

1. Introduction

1.1. Personal authority on this subject:

Tanzania was my third country in my international career with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Tanzania was also my sunset country in my career with the organization, having been posted to a total of 13 countries. I exited UNHCR from Tanzania, a country where I worked an aggregate of 8 years, of the 32 I did in UNHCR. That represents 25% of my career with the United Nations. As well should I know the operation because I was posted first as a Field Officer, secondly as a Programme Officer, thirdly and finally as the country's Representative of the High Commissioner.

All said, there is no gainsaying that this review does represent only my views as the expert on the matter and not those of any other person or organization.

1.2. The subject-matter

Refugees are a global phenomenon and a human tragedy that does not start in our recent past. Indeed, Jesus Christ, Prophet Mohammed and other key figures in the history of humanity have been refugees. In fact, Jesus was a refugee in Africa, highlighting the natural social protective environment that is inherent in the continent’s cultures. And when discussing the history of, and governance in, the United Republic of Tanzania, an important inescapable demographic is that of refugees. This chapter discusses refugees from an historical perspective, with the aim of reviewing the governance context and offer suggestions for a better way forward.

Before focusing on asylum-seekers and refugees in Tanzania, let us start by mentioning the three categories of human tragedy that have a common trait: the need for, and absence of, protection by their national governments. This happens when people are forced to move, and in turn, forced movement happens in three instances:

• Persecution or fear of persecution in the national territory and flight into other countries. These are refugees.

• Flight from internal conflict or natural disasters from one part of the national territory into another, but not resulting in movement outside of the country: these are internally displaced populations (IDPs) whose situations very often result into not getting the protection of their governments for various reasons, including of access. And

• People, usually young, desperate to find meaning and employment in life who look for any ways, mostly informal, of leaving their country in search for better opportunities: these are migrants. Migrants are a much wider group that also includes people who migrate for employment offered in another country and who take normal, official, and formalized routes. The difference here is that migrants moving in informal and irregular ways also get into a situation where this movement exposes them to human suffering, trafficking and death, and their stay in other countries does not attract the protection of their countries of origin. Indeed, many a time, neither are they protected by institutions of the host country of migration; they are often exploited, and oppressed and their human dignity is often humiliated.

In this complex situation of human movement, governments are increasingly tending to lump together refugees and migrants. There is also the category of stateless persons, but these have a social history that is quite distinct. This chapter does not attempt to review statelessness.

It is to be noted nonetheless that refugees and asylum-seekers are a very specific group of people in need of international protection, and that protection is provided by governments of countries of asylum. Refugee situations are governed by an international legal regime, and in Africa by an additional Continental Convention, and almost all countries in Africa have also enacted domestic laws governing refugees and asylum-seekers. The General Assembly of the United Nations has designated the person of the High Commissioner for Refugees and his office as the inter-governmental entity that supports governments and oversees the delivery of protection (and of durable solutions) to refugees worldwide, with the exception of the Palestinian people, providwed for under the mandate of UNRWA.

Secondly, the internally displaced populations: the civil wars in many countries have resulted, not only in the exodus of populations into neighbouring countries, but also forced movements from unsafe to safer areas within the same country. To civil wars or internal conflict, we should add acts of nature that also force populations to move, such as earthquakes, desertification and droughts, floods, which can displace entire populations within the country, and in many instances render governments unable to assist them (problems of access or problems of being or being perceived as a party to the conflict). While there is no international legal regime to guide responses to situations of internal displacement, the African continent has provided a global example by adopting the universally-unique 2009 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally-Displaced Persons in Africa (The Kampala Convention).

And thirdly, one needs to distinguish migrants into regular and irregular, and emphasize the notion of irregularity in discussing the need for human and social protection. Irregular migrants may need protection in situations where governments of their countries of origin may not be aware of their precarious situation. Such a strong instrument as the Refugee Convention does not exist for migrants. The 2018 Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration has attempted to bring some form of recognition to the challenges of migration, but does not offer protection as a duty, neither is it enforceable by law. It is considered as a framework, a proposed way. All said and done, we need to recognize that humanity evolution has been characterized by two important human movements: migration towards other environments, human expansion and economic pursuit; and the search for protection from wars or other forms of political exclusion, social persecution, by seeking asylum in other countries. Both are part of centuries of human history.

Having stated these facts, in this Chapter we limit ourselves to refugees and asylum-seekers.

2. Key facts about Refugees in Tanzania

Underlying the management of the refugee phenomenon in Tanzania, two sets of legal and policy instruments shall be mentioned:

2.1. International conventions

Tanzania is a State-Party

• to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention on and its 1967 Protocol which the government signed in May 1964 and which attained force of law in September 1968 with the deposit of the instruments of accession.

• to the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa. Tanzania signed this convention in September 1969 and ratified it in January 1975.

2.2. National laws

The management of the refugee phenomenon in Tanzania is historical and has been based

• first, on the Refugee Control Act, 1965, subsequently replaced by

• The Refugees Act, 1998 and later modified by

• The Refugee Policy, 2003.

This chapter will discuss the interplay of these legal and policy instruments and their impact on the welfare of refugees and on durable solutions to their condition.

3. Historical summary

The refugee situation in Tanzania has gone through several mutations. As stated below, the refugee tradition of Tanzania starts before independence when the British exercised Trusteeship over the Tanganyika territory, spoils of German occupation, after Germany lost World War II: the hosting of Polish refugees from that War. In effect, the British colonial government organized the dispersal of Polish refugees from Europe into Iran and East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania). Polish refugees in Tanzania were hosted in Dar-es-Salaam and Tengeru, with smaller settlements in Kondoa, Ifunda and Kidugala.

Evidently all Polish settlements are closed. Historical traces of this presence can be seen in cemeteries in Tengeru, Dar-es-Salaam, Kigoma and Morogoro. That part of the history has come to shape how refugees were managed by Tanzania as an independent country.

After its own independence, Tanzania remained a territory of asylum for freedom movements fighting colonialism in countries as far as Angola, and as near as Mozambique, and including: South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. At the time, the refugee population was managed under the Refugee Control Act, 1965. In effect, the commitment of Mwalimu Nyerere to supporting the liberation of other countries made Tanzania the natural country to which liberation movements gravitated, together with their families. This pivotal role of Tanzania led the OAU (predecessor to the AU) to ask Tanzania to host the headquarters of the Africa Liberation Committee (Garden Avenue, opposite the Canada High Commission), for a long time headed by the late Hashim Mbita (Brig), a Tanzanian national.

Tanzania similarly provided asylum to refugees fleeing their countries for reasons of exclusion based on profound ethnic discrimination (Rwanda, Burundi) and violent events in the Great Lakes Region that seriously impacted and continue to impact the Eastern flank of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Up to 1994, the policies of the government allowed refugees to become productive and self-sustaining and integrated into the host communities. Soon these refugees did not require or receive any humanitarian assistance from the government or from UNHCR because they were able to carry out agricultural activities on the land given. They became productive in the community and independent of assistance. By selling part of their harvest, refugees would earn some money and contribute positively to the Tanzanian economy. Indeed, to this day, 25% of the foodstuffs sold in the Kisutu market in Dar-es-Salaam come from the old settlements of Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu.

In terms of social and economic organization, each refugee family was allocated 5 hectares of land and all community and social services (health, education, water, etc) were fully shared with the host population.

• in Ulyankulu settlement (Tabora), refugees lived in eleven villages. There were twelve primary schools, a vocational training center, a rural health center, five dispensaries, and fifty-five water wells.

• In Katumba settlement (Mpanda), refugees were settled in twenty-nine villages with twenty-four primary schools, one secondary school and one vocational school, two health centers, six dispensaries, two to six water wells per village.

• In Mishamo settlement (Mpanda), refugees were settled in sixteen villages with sixteen primary schools, one health center, four dispensaries, one cooperative, and 250 water boreholes.

Many more of these types of refugee settlements were created in other parts of Tanzania in the 1970s.

Major refugee influxes

Below is a summary the events that locate the origins of each refugee group hosted at different times in Tanzania, without going into the detailed history.

(a) Rwandan Refugees

1959

The Belgian colonial policy of ethnic discrimination has come to determine the immediate past history of Rwanda. In 1959, there was in Rwanda what was called a Hutu uprising that resulted in the killing of many Rwandan Tutsi, causing the exodus of 330,000 who sought refuge mainly in Uganda and Tanzania. This dramatic event directly preceded Rwanda’s independence.

1994

On April 6, Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien Ntaryamira, Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi respectively were killed on an airplane that was shot down in Kigali. This dramatic event immediately sparked the genocide. This dramatic event resulted in the flight of millions of refugees into DRC, Tanzania, Burundi and other countries in the Great Lakes region. Tanzania: by 1995 there were approximately 700,000 Rwandans living in camps in the Kagera Region; this refugee population climbed from 292,100 at the end of 1992 to 883,300 at the beginning of 1995.

This major demographic dislocation was the trigger for Tanzania’s major change of policy in 1995. At the end of 1995, Tanzania had decided to expel (refoul) the entire Rwandan refugee population, which happened in December 1996. What brought about this major policy shift? An explanation is attempted in this chapter.

Rwandan refugee camps (all closed)

Camp/Settlement District

Murango (settlement, 1959 influx) Karagwe

Burigi (settlement, 1959 influx) Muleba

Kimuli (settlement, 1961 influx) Karagwe

Muyenzi (settlement, 1961 influx) Ngara

Chabalisa I Karagwe

Chabalisa II Karagwe

Omukariro Karagwe

Kagenyi I Karagwe

Kagenyi II Karagwe

Lukole Ngara

Benaco Ngara

Lumasi Ngara

Musuhura Ngara

Kitali Biharamulo

(b) Burundian Refugees

1972

In April 1972, the long practices of exclusion from political participation based on ethnicity resulted in a civil war and massacres in Burundi against the Hutu, and the flight of some 300,000 Burundi nationals, mostly into Tanzania but also into then Zaire. In Tanzania, these were received and installed in three famous settlements: Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba and others were allowed to integrate into villages in the Kigoma Region. As stated earlier, these refugees were allowed to be productive and soon dispensed of the emergency humanitarian assistance. The history of this group is long and complex and includes an unfinished programme of naturalization. While some of the 1972 wave had returned, others remained in the settlement, and a second opportunity for organized repatriation happened in 2008-2011 when some 50,000 repatriated, at the time when the government naturalized simultaneously more than 162,000. We cannot, for the purposes of this synopsis, do justice to the full story of this group but we briefly touch on it further in this chapter as “matters unfinished”.

1993

The Burundian civil war lasting from October 1993 (after the assassination of the elected President, Melchior Ndadaye) to 2005 created a second wave of refugees into Tanzania. This group was provided asylum at a politically sensitive time in Tanzania. For both national and regional political reasons, Tanzania expedited the closure of Mtabila camp thus expelling the recalcitrant Burundians for whom there seemed to be no reason to continue enjoying the protection of the asylum institution. That was after a process of interviews to ascertain their need for international protection. This exercise was conducted by UNHCR following the verbal declaration of cessation by the Minister of Home Affairs in 2009 and refusal of refugees to leave Mtabila camp. This camp was closed in 2012, a decision that generated much controversy. The 1993 group is politically linked to the Arusha peace process, mentioned below.

2015

The 2015 Third mandate of the President of Burundi resulted in political turmoil in the country and persecutions that resulted in the third major Burundi refugee influx into Tanzania (and DRC, Uganda and Rwanda). This is the core of the Burundi refugees that still remain in the Nduta and Nyarugusu camps, Mtendeli camp having been closed in 2021 in an orderly and consensual manner for the first time. A voluntary repatriation programme exists as we write, and has been operational since September 2017.

There can be no telling the history of Burundi refugees without mentioning two features of distinction for Tanzania:

• Solutions Diplomacy: the central role of Tanzania, not just as a country of asylum, but also as a country of regional solutions diplomacy, having helped to find political accommodation and resolution to ethnic recurrent conflicts both in Rwanda and Burundi.

• ARUSHA at the centre: This mediation role has made the town of Arusha a regional and international reference, both when discussing regional crises (The ICTR) and when discussing development and regional cooperation (Several EAC institutions based there). Indeed, the two Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi that were killed in the plane accident that sparked the Rwanda genocide, were returning from negotiations in Arusha. Similarly, the late President Nkurunziza was, not only a refugee, but also an active participant in the Arusha peace process that finally saw him ascend to the presidency of his country. (by the way, also, Arusha is conveniently located at the entrance to the Northern tourist circuit, a convenient combination for quiet diplomacy and relaxation).

(c) Congolese Refugees

In 1965, Tanzania received a good number of refugees from Malawi and Zaire after assassination of Patrice Lumumba. Both groups were settled at Pangale, Tabora. While the Malawians found their way into various towns and either became self-employed or found other ways of living, the settlement was dissolved as many refugees voluntarily returned to Zaire following an amnesty granted in their country. Those that remained were later relocated to Lugufu camp, including political refugees like Laurent Kabila and his fellow refugees, who later settled in Dar-es-Salaam. And the rest is history.

Eastern DRC: One of the most dramatic effects of the conflict that spread in the Great Lakes Region as a result of the Rwanda genocide of 1994 was, and still is, its impact and constant influx of people seeking asylum in Tanzania from South Kivu and Tanganyika Provinces of Eastern DRC. It makes the DRC refugees one of the most protracted situations, with many having remained in exile no less than 28 years now. Eastern DRC has been permanently insecure since 1994 with many irregular non-state armed groups that control the area and exploit its natural resources, spread death, misery and despair. Despite some repatriation movements having taken place at different times since, insecurity remains the hallmark of Eastern DRC.

Burundian/Congolese refugee camps (mostly in Kigoma Region)

Camp/settlement Status District

Mtendeli Closed Kibondo

Mtabila I Closed Kibondo

Mtabila II Closed Kibondo

Kanembwa Closed Kibondo

Mkugwa Closed Kibondo

Nduta Active Kibondo

Nyarugusu (Burundians and DRC) Active Kasulu

Lugufu I (mostly Congolese) Closed Uvinza

Lugufu II Closed Uvinza

Muyovosi Closed Uvinza

Katumba (settlement) Naturalized Katavi (10,800 not naturalized)

Mishamo (settlement) Naturalized Katavi (3,200 not naturalized)

Ulyankulu (settlement) Naturalized Tabora (4,900 not naturalized)

Durable Solutions

Before returning to the policy discussion, a short consideration about durable solutions is relevant here. As any topic in this chapter, durable solutions in themselves would warrant a whole treatise or book.

It is an accepted fact that the most durable and permanent solution to a refugee situation is REPATRIATION, for obvious reasons of belonging/culture and reintegration. For repatriation to happen, significant positive changes must happen in the country of origin, enough to attract its nationals. UNHCR normally enters into agreement (tripartite agreements) with both the country of origin and of asylum to ensure that any such repatriation is voluntary and based on updated information on conditions in the country of origin. There are situations where refugees may decide to return to their countries of origin even if the situation may not have changed significantly. If the return is informed and voluntary, return in less-than-ideal conditions is possible and all parties to the agreement commit to respect such refugee decisions. However, for any organized repatriation, more fundamental changes in the political situation that created the refugee movement to start with, must be observed and acknowledged by all.

In addition to repatriation, there are also opportunities that some third countries offer to take some of the refugee burden from primary countries of asylum into their territory, to settle and make a new life. This is RESETTLEMENT and is part of responsibility-sharing. Unfortunately, there are very few countries of resettlement, the most prominent being the United States of America. Others are Canada, Australia and a few European countries. In Africa, resettlement has been attempted in Benin Republic and Burkina Faso. In relation to the refugee burden, resettlement represents less than 1% of the caseload globally and continent-wide. And given the essentially rural nature of the refugees, the opportunities become even more restricted.

The third, LOCAL SETTLEMENT, has been implemented by Tanzania in relation to Rwandan refugees of 1959. It has also been decided on the 1972 Burundian refugees. Given the dramatic events of 1994 and the manner in which naturalized Rwandans behaved after those events in their country, Tanzania has become averse to discussing or admitting local settlement as a solution. In addition to these events, also the political evolution in Tanzania has changed the way refugees are seen and managed, as is discussed below.

4. An Evolving Asylum History

In 1977, Tanzania hosted a total of some 215, 000 refugees (Rwanda, Burundi and Mozambique). By the 1980s, 30, 000 of the 35,000 Rwandese refugees were offered Tanzanian citizenship as a group.

The crisis in neighbouring Burundi (1993) and Rwanda (1994) lead to a massive influx of refugees in the regions of Kagera and Kigoma (Western Tanzania) in a very short time span. In the period 1994 – 1996, Kagera alone hosted over 700 000 refugees, compared to a local population of 1.5 million. This crisis, as indicated, was the deciding factor of policy change. Indeed, receiving 700,000 new refugees, of whom over 250,000 crossed Rusumo border (Ngara District) in two days, was dramatic on security, on the environment and on inter-state relations.

On the other hand, as refugee numbers increased, international assistance dwindled. In a context of profound changes in the political and economic environment, refugees became more of a liability. So, the settlements approach gave way to refugee camps tightly controlled by camp commandants, replacing the integration of refugees into the community, by a practice of isolating and excluding them from municipal considerations. The emphasis on refugee self-sufficiency and local settlement was replaced by an exclusive and at times obsessive focus on repatriation. By 1995, the change of policy emphasized repatriation as the sole solution and that such repatriation should be expedited for refugees living in Tanzania.

Need for special attention: In the middle of these restrictive policies, the Government of Tanzania still announced in 2007 the naturalization of Burundian refugees who had been in Tanzania since 1972.  By 2010, some 162,100 applications had been approved. Then the government announced in 2011 the suspension of the process, which was revived in October 2014. Tanzania’s President at that moment, Jakaya Kikwete, granted citizenship to all approved applicants, along with their dependents born after the application process, on October 14, 2014. Is the process completed? Please see part 6 of this chapter.

5. Tanzanian National Refugee Policy and Governance

5.1. Current refugee Policy

In legislating the refugee question, the first law was entitled Refugee Control Act (note our emphasis on the word Control). For a country committed to both supporting liberation movements in territories still under colonial rule, and therefore allowed to enter, reside, and organize their own liberation, it is legitimate that the government also would need to ensure that this support does not impact negatively on national security.

That has evolved. after independence of most countries, refugee situations (mostly from Rwanda, Burundi and DRC) have been victims of internal conflict. Hence the wise move to divest the law of its control character, while insisting on the need to maintain the civilian character of asylum, which allowed the first refugees from Rwanda and Burundi to be settled in less controlled environments - human settlements. Hence the 1998 Refugee Act (note the pointed removal of the word Control).

However, in 2003 a Refugee Policy was introduced that effectively reverses this spirit. In addition, it must be pointed out that in jurisprudence, a refugee policy would have preceded, and informed the Refugee Act, which is a sovereign act of Parliament as the supreme legislator, not the other way round.

It may indeed be opportune to have a new Act, but that would need to be sustained by a prior revision of the Refugee Policy, which was drafted with manifestly little regard to legal advice; in its second paragraph for instance, it already portrays refugees contrary to the letter and spirit of the UN Convention (as human beings in need of protection), by characterizing them instead and primarily as a national security threat. Putting it at the beginning of the policy document already, this notion determines and vitiates the interpretation of everything else that follows and which is otherwise positive in the official document. It characterizes the provision of asylum already as a national threat even before considering the collective or individual plights of asylum-seekers. A policy issued after an Act of parliament opens the door to individual interpretations that are contrary to the spirit in which asylum shall be granted, depending on the political moment.

This assertion is reinforced by four additional concepts in the policy that require serious review, vis:

1. The subtle fusion of the notion of refugee with that of migrant in the Mission statement. Although this conflation is a universal phenomenon, Tanzania and the continent that has had the most experience with refugees, should be sensitive to the distinctive notions. Of course, there are areas of commonality, but they do not necessarily originate from the same phenomena.

2. The mission statement of the policy emphasizes once more issues of criminality, security and environment and fails to recognize that while refugees, as in any human grouping, contribute to these problems, these are problems that exist, whether there be refugee or no refugee. In fact, research has proven that there is no more crime where refugees reside than there is in other areas that never experienced refugee settlement.

3. More worryingly is the introduction in the Policy of the notion that the international community consider the creation of enclaves of peace in countries of origin (safe zones) in their own countries instead, where populations that wished to flee would be contained and protected. How these enclaves would operate and under whose authority? The notion does not take into account the lived experience of the French Operation Turquoise in Rwanda. And so, humanitarian actors would interpose themselves and become (un)witting participants to a national conflict.

4. Finally, the policy affirms that using the education curriculum of the country of origin will encourage returns. The assumption has not been proven anywhere in the world, it does not stand to logic and denies refugees the benefits of a Tanzania education system that is of high quality compared to Burundi and Eastern DRC. It unwittingly denies Tanzania of the opportunity to cultivate among refugees small ambassadors of the country that treated them well, as well as promoters of vernacular Swahili in their own countries.

The policy is premised therefore on assumptions that may not have been grounded in research or confirmed by operational practicians and by legal opinion. Neither does it seem to have originated from a consultation process with the parties interested in the refugee question. Hence its ineffectiveness in both offering a true basis for durable solutions, and in its failure to optimize a long and protracted refugee presence in Tanzania for the economic advancement of the host Districts. Instead, the human capacities are confined to camps, perennially dependent. Looking at the old Settlements and what they still produce to-day (as we write) could be an inspiration.

5.2. Policy and Practice

A policy that wishes away refugees is historically unwise, and in the long run detrimental to effective solutions and to the stability and security of Tanzania. As such, a longer-term policy would be desirable, one that moves away from seeing refugees simply as a burden, to finding ways of utilizing and developing their capacities to contribute to nation-building while in exile. Instead of warehousing them into closed and extremely controlled camps, and rendering them useless to themselves, to the society that shelters them, and in future to their communities of origin when they return. These are human capacities from which the hosting municipalities can derive economic benefit. Such an approach will also have a future impact on the durability of repatriation, as people will have improved their lives and skills. Reviewing in an inclusive manner the compatibility of international commitments with national policy and priority interests would be timely.

A purely humanitarian approach to a refugee situation that is now stable is deficient. There are areas that are no longer humanitarian after the initial emergency of 2015, but developmental in nature: the environment, education, health and social issues. While the priority in an emergency period is to save lives through the deployment of nimble NGOs, once stabilized, the approach should consider blending the humanitarian and developmental challenges. For example, while humanitarian agencies profess and struggle with the Age, Gender and Diversity Mainstreaming approach (AGDM), and are inefficient at it, this ignores and does not take advantage of a technically fully qualified Ministry that has already integrated that AGDM approach in the management and delivery of services to the Tanzanian population: the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Community Development, Gender, Elderly and Children. Humanitarian agencies struggle with the aged, the children and other vulnerabilities and have created unsustainable responses to these issues, further fragilizing refugees.

5.2.1. The environment

A second look at how the environment is viewed in the refugee context could be opportune. The theme of Environment is far more than tree planting and construction of gabions. In fact, planting trees without anybody owning them is a waste of resources and a public deception. An intellectually honest discussion around this theme is called for, with the government-mandated expert Ministry.

In places where the biggest village is no more than 2,000 persons, the government has decided to gazette camps of more than 50,000 (the current biggest being over 120,000 persons). Clearly, the environment is one big casualty. However, by insisting on viewing the environment as solely a humanitarian phenomenon, pressure is being accumulated on insufficient and ever-dwindling humanitarian resources. Perhaps the government and UNHCR and other partners could be encouraged to build a partnership and present the environmental problems as a development challenge to be financed by development funds on a long-term programme, as part of burden-sharing, implemented by the government departments mandated and technically qualified for the effect. It is said that such an initiative existed called the Green Climate Fund, which has failed to materialize due to divergent interests. If it is not dead, a strong political direction can make the Green Climate Fund a reality for the refugee-impacted Kigoma Region. Especially since Tanzania is an accredited member of the Fund. That could be a clear demonstration of burden-sharing.

5.2.2. Management inclusion and Technical (as distinct from policy) Oversight

A wholesome refugee programme is very complex in terms of human, municipal, environmental, and security contributions. This complexity demands active oversight and involvement of more government departments duly mandated and technically competent. For instance, one can question whether there is national technical oversight over health and education. And how technically Tanzania ensures that refugee identification, birth registration and civil status changes are recorded on time and properly. The different facets of this demographic management are mandated functions of specific Ministries. By their nature, the functions cannot be contained in a single government entity in an efficient manner.

Such an inclusive approach would better integrate the way in which humanitarian agencies do business, with national sectoral government policy and technical guidance and oversight. For instance, without a consistent and systematic civil status registration and certification, the risk of statelessness is real and exists in silence in the Tanzania operation. Birth, death, marriage, and divorce certificates are all part of a proper civil status management of a demographic group.

The oversight of the national refugee policy is vested by law in a Refugee Services Department under the Minister of Home Affairs. Nonetheless, refugees tend to remain in border areas, in Regions where local authorities have so far no role defined in the Act. Considering the historical importance of the refugee demographic pressure in the local administration, a new Policy and a new Act could foresee widening the participation of local government in technical oversight of the quality of services practiced in their municipalities, under the authority of TAMISEMI.

As a simple example, refugees (as a sizeable demographic quantity) usually remaining in border areas, represent a public health potential that could affect the host population: border areas have been known to be affected from time to time by epidemics. Clearly, Ebola, COVID-19, and other epidemics can be more efficiently managed if the oversight role of the Ministry of Health is formally recognized in any policy review as the mandated expert Ministry on health. That will ensure compliance with national standards while leaving the humanitarian organizations the responsibility to raise resources in support of the actual delivery of those services. Integration of health services in refugee camps into the national system can benefit the host communities in respective regions because health facilities in the camp have resources and expertise which in district or health facilities in the host community are not available. That would resolve the erroneous dichotomy of hosts having poorer services than refugees.

6. Matters Unfinished

The 1972 Burundian caseload

The year 1972 was fifty years ago and most of those who know Burundi are either very old or dead. These Burundi refugees were given two opportunities to return and UNHCR by mandate should remain ready to assist whoever in this group still wants to return. It ought to be acknowledged that the current generations will have teased relations with the Tanzanian population, or are emotionally linked to Tanzania, where they may have been born, educated, buried their relatives, and essentially do not know their parents’ country of origin.

This situation requires that the government discuss frontally and frankly this group, while clearly shielding this process from being infiltrated by Burundian refugees of the other two latter influxes (1993 and 2015).

These refugees are not just in Mishamo Katumba and Ulyankulu, they are also in the Kigoma villages. We are informed that many UNHCR Tanzanian staff have a vast knowledge of this group and can be very valuable resource persons to get a deeper understanding of the complexities and of the human limbo that could result in a situation of statelessness.

The naturalized: There is however an important part of this group (majority) that was naturalized as Tanzanians. The United Nations, led by UNHCR, together with the Tanganyika Christian Refugee Services, have an important repository of the history of this group and represent an institutional memory. The execution of any long-term programme for the naturalized, to ensure that they enjoy the fruits of their status, should include development partners, and adopt a development approach working with the Prime Minister’s office and UNDP. FCDO and UNDP have also indicated their interest in this 1972 dossier.

Conclusion

The ambition of this analysis is to provide a bird’s view of a complex human problem in one country. Complex problems require quite elaborate solutions and the shaking of the tree ever so often. For that to happen, there is a need for a thorough honest review of the business model, including a cogent, positive, and participatory review of the management framework. It being understood that different mandates reside in different bodies, hopefully with a technical capacity to deliver and be regularly answerable to Parliament if required.

Refugees have been a permanent feature of the United Republic of Tanzania since before independence and it serves no national interest to act as if the problem will go away in the next five years. Patient, systematic, planned, and deliberate regular (annual?) consultations with a wide array of partners from the humanitarian, diplomatic, donorship, academic, and government realms become a necessity. Local appropriation of the refugee problem will ensure that local development concerns are integrated into the way business around refugees is conducted. And a strong public communications strategy will ensure that refugees can be debated as a national issue. -

Jose Canhandula, June 2023