MY LIFE WITH THE UN - ARTICLE 4

UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA (long read)

A. NGARA, Kagera Region

Two years after my family was evacuated from Luanda, Angola, through Windhoek, to Dar-es-Salaam, I did miss them because by the time they left Angola, we had had a second child and I remained alone in Luanda for 2 years. I felt the need to reunite with my young family. So, when an opportunity arose, I applied for Tanzania and was selected for Ngara, where I reported in October 1994. By that time, the huge influx of March 1994 from the Rwanda genocide had reduced. But the political environment following the Genocide in Rwanda remained excessively charged in the entire Great Lakes Region, to a point where the High Commissioner for Refugees, S. Ogata, had appointed a Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, a senior UNHCR staff, Pierce Geretty. Countries affected were DRC, Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda, and far afield, in Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Angola, Congo-B.

During my tour of duty in Tanzania (1994-2000), there were three Representatives: Kolude Duarte, Marjon Kamara and Andrew Sokiri. Marjon Kamara would be my chief this second time and a third time in Geneva, Switzerland.

If there was a country operation that affected me deeply as an employee of UNHCR, and where I started understanding the politics and economic dynamics of refugee operations, that was in Tanzania. Here, the issue of refugee asylum practice has been deeply entrenched administratively, politically and sociologically. Also, the humanitarian response approaches adopted for the reception and management of the refugee question, had evolved, as illustrated by the dichotomy created by revised policies:

1. The 1972 Burundi refugees: these were settled in a system of open settlements, integrated with the host population and allocated enough land to practice agriculture. Education, health and water were integrated services. Refugees in those settlements became so productive that until today, over fifty years later, 30% of the foodstuffs sold in the Kisutu market in Dar-es-Salaam comes from the old settlements. So economically successful were the settlements that an American company had tried to get part of the settlements land to expand production of rice and tobacco that the refugees were already producing, for commercial purposes.

2. Given the pollical complexities of the Great Lakes Region leading the dramatic events of 1994, all other influxes of refugees after 1990 were managed according to a modified policy of strict encampment and isolation, maintaining refugees extremely dependent on humanitarian assistance, and close to the borders.

During my time in Tanzania, there were two important influxes: of Rwandan refugees in 1994, the most dramatic and most intense (approximately 830,000) into the Kagera Region, Ngara and Karagwe Districts, where UNHCR opened Sub-Offices. And the influx of Congolese refugees from Eastern DRC caused by the Rwanda crisis, into Kigoma Region (1997 onwards).

There were several camps in Ngara District: Benaco, Lukole, Lumasi I and 2, Musuhura, Kabanga (developed but abandoned by government instruction).

From 1994 to 1996 I was Field Officer for a refugee camp called Lumasi, with some 160,000 refugees. I was involved in scheduling and negotiating assistance, as well as organizing all the NGOS working in the camp, no less than 18, a dramatic departure from my previous experiences. During this period there were a few refugees who wished to return to Rwanda and I accompanied them to the Rusumo border, just 28Km away. We put buses at their disposal, and sometimes only three in a day would report to return. Such small numbers, we put them in my vehicle and drove them to the border. One day, we met a journalist fishing for stories at the Rusumo border while transferring returnees to the immigration staff, who wrote:

No wonder refugees are not returning to Rwanda.  They are waiting for an air-conditioned land-cruiser to repatriate in style.

In a period where UNHCR Tanzania was perceived, even by UNHCR colleagues in Rwanda, as being against repatriation, such statement for readers of the political moment was heavy with significance, as it implied that we were playing the game of discouraging refugees from returning. When all I was doing was avoiding a whole bus to ferry just a couple of refugees. In any case, I always considered the UNHCR nice vehicles as ultimately refugee property.

In that period, the assistance programme was a huge affair with more than 36 NGOs working with UNHCR and other self-financed partners in Ngara alone. A huge machinery that included some 96 UNHCR international staff.

• Full with a dedicated aircraft service based in Mwanza for Ngara, Karagwe, Kigoma, Kasulu, Kibondo and which went all the way to Bujumbura and Eastern DRC when necessary.

• And an immigration post in Ngara to allow us to fly directly between Ngara and Nairobi.

• And a catering service for international staff, flown from Nairobi.

It was a complex operation clearly requiring diverse and strong management and political skills. In fact, during that time, four of UNHCR staff were declared PNG and a fifth one left through Rwanda just in time to avoid such ignominious declaration. They were banned from Tanzania for a period of 4 years. One of them had a Tanzanian mother living in Dar-es-Salaam, but could not visit her during this banning period! Times were tense for everyone.

I could write a long treatise about this period, including how we used schools and other existing infrastructure to receive a continuing influx of refugees before they were taken to camps and how the local population was in the forefront of the refugee reception response. I will simply relate two events during my stay in Ngara: (a) the presence of Tutsi refugees in the Region, and (b) a political decision to accelerate repatriation to Rwanda, to prevent the camps from becoming grounds for opposition to the new government in Rwanda.

(a) By the time I was in Ngara, the Burigi refugee settlement in the Burigi National Reserve (Muleba District) hosted Rwandan Tutsi refugees that had been in Tanzania for a long time. With the events in Rwanda, and the proximity of Hutu refugees, a repatriation movement started in this settlement in 1995, and I was sent to stay there briefly and facilitate their repatriation. There were 3,000 refugees and 8,000 heads of cattle. To be sure, the cattle was returned on foot by the cattle-keepers, supported by a police escort. The few that did not have cattle we carried them by bus. It was a 3-month operation.

(b) In December 1996 the then Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees, Sergio Vieira de Mello, visited Tanzania and came to Karagwe and Ngara to inform us in no uncertain terms that with the new government in Rwanda, it was unsustainable and politically unacceptable to have a prolonged refugee operation just at the border, given the particularly virulent events that had created such a refugee influx into Tanzania, Burundi and Eastern DRC. We should therefore work towards promoting repatriation to Rwanda, and let those who had to face justice do so in their country. This repatriation should be concluded within the following 12 months, he told us (rather, instructed us). We relayed the message to our many flabbergasted partners.

B. Dar-es-Salaam

At this point, I had applied and obtained an appointment as Programme Officer to Dar-es-Salaam. So, I transferred, within the country. While dealing with the same issues, now in Dar-es-Salaam I had a wider portfolio that included all refugees in the country: from Kagera, to Kigoma, to Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam.

During my entire 6-year stay in Tanzania, the 1972 Burundi refugees were not part of the protection and assistance programme as they had long become self-sustaining and were producing surpluses of food and commercial crops for the local and regional markets. They had become, way before my arrival, the breadbasket in the Region.

In my new role, I was introduced to a new group of refugees: Bantu Somali refugees in Handeni (some 800) that received very little assistance and were in the process of local integration. We focused on facilitating their local settlement in the Tanga Region, elsewhere behind the Kwadikwazu village, near an old German railway. And there was a small urban refugee population, the focus of whom was health and education.

Without a doubt, the national refugee operation had two main focus progammes:

Kigoma Region (Burundi and Congolese refugees). During that period, there was no significant avenue for durable solutions for Burundi and Congolese refugees, who remained dependent on a poorly-financed assistance programme. Above that, the constant influx of Congolese refugees caused Tanzania to concede additional land in the Lugufu area that accommodated an additional two camps. Since then, those camps have closed and the UNHCR/NGOs compound in Uvinza has been handed over and transformed into the headquarters of a newly crreated District.

Kagera Region: In 1997 the refugee operations in Karagwe and Ngara Districts were focused on preparing for an immediate repatriation. While UNHCR was intent on a 12-month repatriation programme, I was surprised by a government team that insisted on a six months repatriation budget. I consulted my Representative to understand and accept this pressure. I realized it was serious business, so, we agreed on a six-months budget. I had hardly released the first installment for repatriation, when I was told that the camps in Ngara had been encircled by the Tanzania army. The next day, that refugees were being herded into the road and marched on foot, both from Karagwe and Ngara, to the border. We were still grasping the consequences of this event when we were requested to expand the Mwisa prison in Karagwe to accommodate Rwandan refugees who were mobilizing other refugees against repatriating, euphemistically called “the Mwisa separation facility for intimidators”. A prison nonetheless. This was for me the first time I ever encountered a situation where UNHCR was asked to expand a prison facility. While highly political, it felt to me contrary to my understanding of the humanitarian character of the mandate of my employer. We did it anyway, because I rationalized: with other more experienced hands in the house, who was I to question or not to provide the money?

The repatriation that had been announced by Vieira de Mello for 12 months, had turned into 6 months in the pronouncements of government officials, in reality took only 2 weeks. An efficient martial operation conducted by the military, actively discouraging UNHCR staff from intervening even to help the few pregnant women who delivered along the way. All UNHCR field staff could do at the time was to buy and distribute ropes so that the children were not lost in the walking crowd. Children were tied by the wrist to their mothers and walked with their relatives to the Rusumo border. In 2 weeks flat, the repatriation was over, while of course some refugees still opted to run away to other parts of Tanzania, down south to Malawi and Zambia.

Several challenges

Such contrived repatriation, while politically savvy, was a major departure from standard doctrine of voluntariness and dignity and caused difficult dialogues with governments, with partners, and even within UNHCR. In my role, I played a critical part as a junior manager, and confronted the following difficulties (in no particular order):

Challenge one: Abrupt end of operation: with 36 NGOs in Ngara, and I cannot remember how many in Karagwe, the sudden repatriation left UNHCR with three major challenges:

1. informing all NGO partners that the earlier than expected repatriation put a premature end to all commitments celebrated for an entire year.

2. the need for mid-stream conciliation and closure of financial books and return of balances, and

3. abrupt cessation of employment contracts, contracts for delivery of services and goods, retrieval of vehicles, generators, trucks, office equipment and all other assets. Which in turn left the NGOs with the tough task of winding up abruptly and calming spirits of people losing jobs, no less than 6,000 staff at the time. And of suppliers that had lined up their products for delivery.

Challenge: Disposal of assets and demands on the UNHCR vehicles: In retrieving assets post-repatriation/closure of camps, we had a park of more than 180 trucks and 300 light vehicles, hundreds of generators of all sizes. The collected assets could not be absorbed in the remaining Kigoma operation, which was much smaller and already well equipped. The entire exercise attracted lists of wishes received from District and Regional governments and the government partner, all expecting to be offered the vehicles. We tried our best, on the one hand, to follow internal administrative instructions on disposal of assets, and on the other, to be sensitive to the local needs and be responsive to the political pressure. Some were sent to other refugee operations in the region, others were donated, still others were sold on auction. Disposing of the entire stock took us two years. Somehow or other we managed, but the entire exercise was traumatic for me as the central Programme Officer, and as such, the enforcer of operational rules and principles, and the responsible for reporting on the entire process, both to the Representative and to headquarters in Geneva. Expect the queries!!

A third challenge: The famous funding for repatriation agreed with the government partner for six months was not in line with events on the ground, repatriation having taken only two weeks. And therefore, the second installment had not been paid; in fact, there was never the time to even consume a quarter of the first installment. So, in hindsight we concluded that our government colleagues already knew that the funding for 6 months was not necessary. However, in verifying their books, the funds were declared as spent. I asked for the Government auditor to give us a statement of the accounts, which unsurprisingly took the same position as the Department. Another independent audit revealed a huge financial misstatement and misappropriation. Before we could conclude the discussions, a local newspaper published an article declaring that “the Programme Officer, Antonio Jose Canhandula, stated that the government misused over US$xxxxxx of the repatriation money”. The Representative called me on that same morning (I was in the field) to clarify if I had made that kind of statement. I told her that I had not seen the article and, in any case, in my function, our ethics prevented us from conducting relations with the government (or any partner really) through the media. With my assurance, she wrote a public rejoinder, which saved my skin from a government response, which would have otherwise been severe.

Another challenge: how to dramatically reduce UNHCR’s own staff while maintaining the minimum to conclude operations by ensuring environmental cleanup of camps, destruction of abandoned infrastructure and retrieval of grounded assets such as generators, water pumps and other equipment, residual assets management and conclusion of all field commitments, and scheduling closure of offices. A very emotionally trying period.

LESSONS:

I took from Tanzania very many lessons, including those personal mistakes I like to remember, but the most important that I would offer to my colleagues in active UN(HCR) service would be as follows:

1. The Tanzania refugee operations in themselves have been the subject of many academic researches and programme initiatives and there is sufficient literature demonstrating that there are several authorities on the subject-matter, with which UNHCR has teamed at different times. UNHCR was pivotal for instance in the creation of the Centre for the Study of Forced Migration in the University of Dar-es-Salaam. Ignoring history and references sets you to repeating past mistakes. Appreciate your predecessors.

2. The defense put by the Representative of my name to the press on the leaked saga of misappropriation of funds by government staff was for me a major lesson as a manager-in-the-making, because governments tend to react with the full force of municipal sovereign power. That at critical times, my future staff should be able to trust that I will take the fall for them, thus creating for them room for courageous initiatives commensurate with their functions. That in turn will allow them to be innovative and confident in their work, knowing that they will not be abandoned to the political wolves when the going gets tough.

3. Repatriation had become a political issue more than a durable solutions outcome and the difference in the speeches between UNHCR and the government counterpart meant that we were distracting each other’s attention from jointly finding efficient ways of sowing the seeds for really durable solutions in the way assistance was provided. We were dragging each other from one tripartite meeting into another as a political publicity show. In reality, UNHCR staff and management understood very little of the deep political games around the issue of refugees. We knew for instance that in the Burundi refugee camps there were too many visits to the clinics, too many drugs were being dispensed by our health partners (as reported by IRC, one such partner); and we knew that at night, these drugs were collected by fighters coming from Burundi, in meetings with refugees. Meaning, UNHCR never fully realized that the proximity of the refugee camps to the borders was serving other objectives. We collectively fell silent on the principle of “camps should be at least 50Km from the border of the country of origin”.

4. The focus on assets of UNHCR by government counterparts is proof that actually the government at the centre did not know the functioning of the refugee operation. Of course, the government is already busy with major national issues to focus on refugees, but that strong focus on assets was a pointer to a skewed relationship.

5. The partnership and relationship between UNHCR and the government as was then set, meant that the main issues around the refugees, as a demographic group with social rights were not well known to government Ministries such as Education, Health, Social Services and others. As a result, the government easily adopted the notion that there was/is no international burden-sharing. Meaning that beyond a small circle, there is no knowledge of the funding UNHCR provided and continues to provide every year. Therefore, we concluded then, financial resources brought to bear on the refugee operation, by UNHCR, WFP and other UN Agencies involved, were hardly acknowledged. In another article I will come to reinforce the notion that UNHCR remains hostage to a situation of misinformation and perhaps misrepresentation.

6. A few battles may have been an overreach on my responsibilities then: At one point the government issued a letter requesting UNHCR to ensure that no international/foreign NGO employed more than five expatriates. And looking at my list, some had as many as twelve in the refugee operation. I took that edict as my own, until one of my supervisors severely called me to order: are you working for the government or for UNHCR? I did not know how to express at the time what I can now express: indeed, some of the expatriates were coming here to learn and there were Tanzanians who could validly and efficiently carry out some of the tasks entrusted to young expatriates. Never did I know that I was part of an ideological struggle. The issue of expatriates was posed to UNHCR also in very crude terms, by government staff that did not understand why in UNHCR expatriates are needed. Why indeed? My learning:

• Because international staff would normally have had wider exposure to different operations and therefore their skills of working with, and adapting to, different processes, in different environments and with diverse cultures are an added-value.

• Because certain protection accountabilities require of UNHCR the capacity to talk to authority about refugee rights, which can expose nationals to political pressure and intimidation.

• Because of the huge financial and Human Resources accountabilities, as well as the quality of operations, are international accountabilities whose reports the High Commissioner presents to the General Assembly of the United Nations. That accountability can only come from prolonged exposure to operations.

This is a question that is seldom asked, and when asked, we have had difficulties responding convincingly. Nonetheless, in the specific case of Tanzania, the pressure has allowed us to look at certain tasks and to conclude that indeed more effort could be made to grant nationals a bigger share in middle management. Within three years, we managed to increase the number of national professional officers from six countrywide to fourteen by the time I left. I can claim having taken active part in this process.

The question of expatriates sometimes was posited in a manner that showed, more than genuine local sourcing, an old issue of rivalries between Tanzanians and fellow Kenyans coming into Tanzania as expatriates. Apart from the advantage of a common Swahili language, the average Kenyan expresses him/herself much better in English, one of the UN official languages, than his Tanzanian counterpart of equivalent academic exposure, truth be told. A persistent rivalry similar to that which exists between Nigerians and Ghanaians.

Jose, 24 May 2023